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1 Introduction
Cities are where prosperity is won or lost. They can either be the engines 
of economic growth, or dysfunctional sites of congestion, crowding, and 
discontent. One of the main differences is due to the quality and effectiveness of 
policy decisions: some city governments can take effective, timely decisions that 
support the productivity-enhancing features of cities, while others cannot.
For effective decisions to be made, policymakers require conducive institutional 
structures. These do not happen automatically — they have to be built. 
However, creating these structures is hard: institutions encompass a high degree 
of complex interactions, such that reforming them can be an uphill task and 
have a high risk of failing.1 
Cross-country experience suggests that policy decisions can improve their 
effectiveness when focusing on reforming urban institutional structures — such 
as laws, policies, practices, responsibilities, systems, processes — that set the 
rules of governance. This paper, therefore, seeks to understand the institutional 
structures that facilitate first-order decision-making in cities , breaking them 
down across spatial, functional, and temporal lenses. Collectively, this is termed 
as the authorising environment, as depicted in Figure 1.
The physical space is often the most visible manifestation of institutional 
structures that are ill-designed for effective urban governance — many cities 
are governed by multiple distant agencies with few coordinating mechanisms 
between them. For example, the authority of the City Council of Nairobi does 
not cover the entire geographical footprint of the city (see Image 1). Instead, 
the metropolitan region consists of four different counties with separate 
administrative structures, making effective policy coordination difficult. In 
Karachi, the city government has a mandate over only a third of the city’s land, 
with the provincial government controlling about half .2 Lagos is an example 
of one of the few cities in Africa where a single sub-national government 
1 Andrews, M (2013), The limits of institutional reform in development: Changing rules for 
realistic solutions. Cambridge University Press.
2 World Bank (2018), Transforming Karachi into a Livable and Competitive Megacity: A 
City Diagnostic and Transformation Strategy. Directions in Development—Infrastructure. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
The authorising 
environment is the 
institutional structures 
that facilitate decision-
making
Figure 1: The pillars of an authorising environment
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has authority over the entire urban space. This is because the city has grown 
to encompass the entire state of Lagos, giving the Governor of the State the 
necessary authority to make decisions for the whole city.3
Image 1: Growth in human settlements in Nairobi (1986 vs. 2016)4
A similar challenge arises with function. Even if the geographic reach of the 
institutions governing cities is sufficient, the responsibilities between different 
actors, such as various municipal agencies, may still be fragmented. For 
example, no single institution may have the level of authority necessary for 
providing a service or taking a decision; instead, it may be dispersed amongst 
many actors, making coordination costly, or outright impossible.
Transport in Greater Cairo is a case in point, wherein 18 separate government 
entities are responsible for its functioning, each with a substantial role. 
This contributes to a fragmented transport system with little intra-modal 
integration.5 To overcome similar challenges, in 1995, Singapore established a 
consolidated transportation agency that administers all land-based transport 
services within the city-state. Lagos, too, has made positive advances by creating 
a single agency to coordinate all transport-related activities.6 
Building a city that works is a long-term process; governing cities requires the 
capacity to plan ahead. Therefore, along with spatial and functional reach, 
effective authorising environments also need a sufficient temporal reach. This 
can be achieved by having institutions in place that can support the long-term 
planning of infrastructure and service delivery. Alas, policymaking in cities 
is often restricted due to short political cycles and a lack of capacity to plan 
ahead. This can have a significant fiscal impact: evidence shows that providing 
core infrastructure before people settle is three times cheaper than retrofitting it 
in existing unplanned settlements.7
3 Collier, P and A J Venables (2016), “Urban infrastructure for development”, Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 32(3), pp.391-409.
4 https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/88822/nairobi-swells-with-urban-growth 
5 Gómez-Álvarez, D, R M Rajack, E López-Moreno and G Lanfranchi, eds. (2017), Steering 
the Metropolis: Metropolitan Governance for Sustainable Urban Development. Inter-
American Development Bank.
6 Kumar, A and O P Agarwal (2013), “Institutional Labyrinth: Designing a Way Out 
for Improving Urban Transport Services--Lessons from Current Practice”, World 
Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/17630 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”
7 Collier, P, E Glaeser, A Venables, P Manwaring and M Blake (2017),  “Informal 
settlements and housing markets”, IGC Cities that Work Policy Brief,
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Some cities have tried to overcome this through agencies with defined technical 
mandates, which enable them to plan beyond and across political cycles. 
For example, three major cities in Indonesia have established City Planning 
Labs. These labs are dedicated municipal-level facilities that provide data and 
analyses to the city administration for planning and investment decisions. In 
one of them, Semarang, the lab has conducted analyses for medium-term plans 
for the city.8 Such special-purpose organisations, with separately defined longer-
term mandates, can cushion the precarity of political cycles.
Drawing on cross-country experiences and academic literature, this paper 
describes the policy options that can improve the urban authorising 
environment, with a focus on formal decision-making structures. Along with 
policy options for city-level policymakers, the paper also provides options 
for national governments, who typically hold significant authority in shaping 
authorising environment. The options outlined provide an agenda for discussion 
that can be leveraged in a locally embedded reform process. However, it is 
necessary for policymakers to also consider a broader set of factors, especially 
political networks and informal structures that influence decision-making — 
these factors are omitted from the focus of this paper. 
The spatial span of decision-making is the focus of Section II, functional of 
Section III and temporal of Section IV. Section V provides a summary and 
discusses the next steps.
8 World Bank. (2016), How Sharing Data and Collaboration Can Improve Indonesia’s 
Urban Planning. [online] Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
feature/2016/09/22/how-gathering-data-in-one-place-can-improve-indonesia-cities 
[Accessed 13 Feb. 2019].
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2 Improving the spatial span of 
decision-making
Most cities in developing countries are growing rapidly — changing the shape 
and form of the space they occupy. This makes their administrative boundaries 
readily outdated. This is further exacerbated by the fact that this growth is 
largely driven due to sprawl rather than increasing density (see Box 1 for an 
example).9
BOX 1: GOVERNING MANILA
In Manila, the Mayor’s authority covers only 15% of the metropolitan 
population. An attempt to rectify this was the creation of the 
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) in 1986 by 
creating a unified administrative body over the growing city. However, 
challenges continue to persist today, as the mayors of the cities which 
make up the metropolitan area are elected by the residents of their 
jurisdictions, while the head of MMDA is appointed by the President. 
This confuses the line of accountability: the accountability of the 
mayors is downwards to the population while accountability of MMDA 
is upwards to the President.10 This creates the potential for tensions as 
trying to forge collaborations amongst mayors is difficult as they have 
little incentive to cooperate.11
Building effective structures for city-wide collaborations can have clear 
advantages: 
 ✓ It enhances productivity. Although there is still a lack of evidence from 
developing contexts, evidence from OECD countries shows that for a 
given metropolitan area, halving the number of local government units 
raises productivity by 6%.12
 ✓ It reduces inequality. In an administratively fragmented metropolitan 
area, rich people tend to concentrate in different areas to the poor, 
and there are often few mechanisms of redistributing revenue between 
9 Atlas of Urban Expansion; “Anatomy of density I: six measurable factors that together 
constitute urban density” by Shlomo Angel and Patrick Lamson-Hall (2019).
10 von Einsiedel, N (2009), “Governance and Planning in Metro Manila”, Governance 
and Infrastructure Development Challenges in Kathmandu Valley, East-West Center and 
Kathmandu Metropolitan City, Nepal, pp.11-13.
11 Robles, A C  and H Dembowski (2014), Dysfunctional complexity. D+C Development 
and Cooperation.
12 OECD (2015), The Metropolitan Century: Understanding Urbanisation and its 
Consequences, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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them. For example, in Abidjan, which consists of ten communes with 
fragmented authority between them, the average per capita public 
expenditure of the three wealthiest communes was, as of 2007, 49 times 
the average for the three poorest.13 Spatial coherence in terms of the 
institutions within a city may also improve equality on other metrics. 
Evidence from the United States suggests that in more fragmented 
metropolitan regions, there is higher sorting and segragation of people by 
race and class.14 
How can national policymakers improve spatial 
span of decision-making?
The spatial reach of authorising environments is predominantly a national 
government policy choice. In this regard, the principal decision to be made is 
between the different forms of metropolitan urban governance models.
The following are models of cooperation that can be considered:
1 Under the one-tier fragmented model, an urban area has several smaller 
local government units that undertake policy decisions and service 
delivery within their spatial boundaries. This model has often emerged 
organically in many countries as a direct result of the expansion of 
urban settlements beyond the administrative jurisdiction of a single local 
government unit. In Mexico City’s metropolitan region, for example, sixty 
municipalities operate under a one-tier fragmented model.15 
2 Policymakers can consider establishing a one-tier consolidated model 
in which a single urban government provides local services for the full 
geographical area of the city. This type of governance structure can be 
created either by merging various smaller urban governments into a single 
one or allowing one existing government structure to assume control of 
others. An example of such a governance arrangement is Cape Town, 
where before 1994, the city comprised of 61 local government entities.16 
Today, however, the entire metropolitan region is governed under a single-
tier government . The motivation to do this was political, with the aim of  
redistributing resources between wealthy and poor areas. While inequality 
is still pervasive, the municipal government has been able to make inroads 
13 Stren, R (2007), “Urban governance in developing countries: Experiences and 
challenges”. In Governing cities in a global era: Urban innovation, competition and 
democratic reform, ed. Robin Hambleton and Jill Gross, 57–69. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan
14 Florida, R (2015), “Rise of the Fragmented City”. CityLab.
15 Nieto, A B T , J L N Amezquita and M L Vasquez (2018), “Governance of metropolitan 
areas for delivery of public services in Latin America”, REGION, 5(3), pp.49-73. To 
note: The city-proper itself consists of 16 boroughs, each with a separate mayor and an 
overreaching city government – leading to a two-tier structure. However, as the population 
has grown, the city-proper only accounts for 40% of the metropolitan population.
16 Bahl, R W, J F Linn and D L Wetzel (2013), Financing metropolitan governments in 
developing countries. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
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by investing in water distribution, electrification, and sanitation in 
disadvantaged areas.17
3 A combination of the aforementioned two options is the two-tier 
system, wherein the lower-tier mirrors the one-tier fragmented model 
with various smaller units, and a single upper-tier resembles a one-tier 
consolidated model (see Box 2 for the example of Barcelona). This may 
be a more politically feasible option as individual local governments do 
not lose autonomy; at the same time, the top-tier reduces fragmentation 
and improves efficiency, paving the way for an improved authorising 
environment.
BOX 2: TWO-TIER GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN BARCELONA
Before 2011, the metropolitan region was governed by 36 separate 
municipalities, many of whom coordinate on specific policy decisions 
and service delivery, such as the metropolitan transport entity and 
volunteer cooperation through the Association of Municipalities of 
the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. In 2011, the regional government 
established a top-tier for the metropolitan area turning the region into 
a two-tier model. The top-tier is governed by an indirectly elected 
Metropolitan Council, which consists of all the mayors of the 36 
separate municipalities.18 This has led to a substantial reduction of 
complexity and, hence, improvements in efficiency.19
Each of these options has varying degrees of trade-offs associated with them:20
Figure 2: Urban governance models
Economies 
of scale
Ability to 
absorb 
externalities
Integrated 
service 
delivery
Equity Accountability
One-tier 
fragmented 
model
✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
One-tier 
consolidated 
model
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Two-tier 
model ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
17 Slack, E and R Bird (2013), Merging municipalities: Is bigger better? Institute on 
Municipal Finance and Governance.
18 Slack, E and A Côté (2014), Comparative urban governance. Future of cities: working 
paper.
19 BOSCH, N, M ESPASA and J SOLE-VILANOVA (2013), “Governance and Finance 
of Large Metropolitan Areas in Federal Systems: The Case of Spain”. In SLACK, E. & 
CHATTOPADHYAY, R. (eds.), Governance and Finance of Metropolitan Areas in Federal 
Systems. Oxford University Press: Toronto, 223-253.
20 Slack, E and A Côté (2014), Comparative urban governance, Future of cities: working 
paper. Government Office for Science.
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 — Economies of scale: Larger governments can leverage economies of 
scale, i.e. they can reduce input costs for services delivered. For example, 
a larger government, such as under a one-tier model, may be able to 
procure certain goods at a lower per-unit cost, because they will need to 
buy larger numbers. However, there is some evidence that dis-economies 
of scale can emerge even in larger government units where the cost of 
providing some services increases — for example, due to increased costs 
of managing a bureaucracy.21
 — Externalities: Any policy decision, such as investment in infrastructure, 
has an impact on the surrounding area. For example, if one municipal 
government builds a public park, the park’s neighbouring communities 
benefit, perhaps through appreciation of the value of the land (this is the 
archetypical “free riding” problem of public goods). If these neighbouring 
communities are not under the same jurisdiction, one group of people 
will end up financing benefits for another group of people.22 Figure 3 
illustrates this example; although those in Jurisdiction B paid for the 
park, Jurisdiction A also benefit from appreciate in land value.
 — Integrated service delivery: Some services need to be provided across 
a larger geographical space to be effective. For example, when it comes 
to transport, routes and transit options will have to cater to commuters 
from the periphery to their place of work in the city, often crossing 
administrative boundaries. This requires either regional coordination so 
21 Slack, E and A Côté (2014), Comparative urban governance, Future of cities: working 
paper. Government Office for Science.
22 This is in-line with the decentralisation theorem developed by Wallace E. Oates in: Oates, 
W E (1972), Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Figure 3: Externalities in an urban setting
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as to integrate services under fragmented governance, or the creation of 
larger urban governments that cover these areas. 
 — Equity: In many cases, cities have some parts that are wealthier than 
others, as higher-income people tend to cluster together. The government 
would be able to raise more revenue from these areas, and less from 
lower-income areas of the city, transferring wealth between the two. 
Under a smaller administrative scale, these transfers may not be possible.
 — Accountability: Smaller spatial scale allows for more responsive and 
accountable governments as people would have easier access to the 
government.23 
The two-tier model combines the strengths of all the metrics discussed:
 ✓ Under the two-tier model, the lower-tier can be more accountable, while 
the upper- tier can provide economies of scale and can absorb greater 
externalities (as discussed above), thereby combining the strengths of the 
other two models.
 ✗ Failing to properly implement the two-tier model can create further 
complexity due to duplication of functions  amongst the two layers, 
leading to conflicts or gaps between functions. This can make the system 
confusing for residents through complicated chains of accountability 
and responsibility. As a result, implementing the model requires a clear 
division of responsibilities between each tier and a framework under 
which these tiers will interact.
 ✗ The model applies best to large metropolitan areas, rather than small, 
isolated cities. For example, if local government units have large distances 
between them, the policy spillovers are going to be minimal, reducing the 
need for two-tier structures.24 
How can city-level policymakers improve spatial 
span for decision-making?
Apart from lobbying the national government, city leaders do not typically 
have the legal mandate to change their administrative boundaries to encompass 
growing populations. However, they might be able to establish voluntary 
cooperation with neighbouring local governments. This cooperation could 
be in the form of inter-municipal agreements that allow for collaboration 
in specific areas, such as transport, or could take the form of a more broad-
based structural cooperation. An example of such cooperation comes from the 
metropolitan area of São Paulo (see Box 3). 
23 Faguet, J-P (1999), Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? 
Evidence from Bolivia. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2516. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=632586
24 Slack, N E (2004), Models of government structure at the local level. Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations.
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BOX 3: VOLUNTARY COOPERATION IN SÃO PAULO
The City of São Paulo and the 38 surrounding municipalities that make 
up the São Paulo metropolitan area have no overreaching metropolitan 
structure for coordination and service delivery. Seven of these 
municipalities, however, collaborate voluntarily through the Greater ABC 
Inter-municipal Consortium. Key features of the consortium include 
a Council of Municipalities which makes collective decisions, and a 
Regional Strategic Planning Department which forms thematic groups 
for specific sectors and is made up of representatives of each of the 
seven municipalities that are a part of the consortium.25 
 ✓ Voluntary cooperation can pave the way for stronger cooperation in the 
future. This was the case, for example, between the municipalities of 
Marseilles, Marignane, and Saint-Victoret in France, where voluntary 
cooperation led to a formalised metropolitan organisation.26 
 ✗ Voluntary cooperation might not be sustainable. Continued collaboration 
often depends on the mutual interest of the municipalities. When such 
interest diminishes, perhaps due to a change in government, these 
agreements may end, even if coordination was beneficial.27
25 Kellas, H (2010), Inclusion, collaboration and urban governance: Brazilian and 
Canadian experiences. University of British Columbia.
26 ibid.
27 Slack, E (2018), Options for metropolitan governance in Greater Kampala. International 
Growth Centre (IGC) Working Paper. Reference: C-43425-UGA-1
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3 Improving the functional span of 
decision-making
In many cities, functional responsibilities tend to be fragmented: the same 
function can belong to several different agencies or completely forgotten 
altogether. For example, in Kigamboni, Tanzania, three agencies have a 
responsibility for administrating land transfers : the municipality, the districts 
land office, and the central government.28 This leads to wasteful duplication, 
the divergence of practices, and potential gaps in responsibility (see Box 4 for 
another example from the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
In many developing countries, the authority to implement decisions at the 
city level still tends to be disproportionately concentrated within the central 
government. This is the case with Tanzania for example, where the authority 
for city-level decisions is increasingly being centralised.29 In China, by contrast, 
local governments have been awarded discretion to experiment and implement 
projects at a city level, which is an important reason for their relative success in 
managing rapid urbanisation.30
BOX 4: 350 YEARS TO FORMALISE LAND RIGHTS IN CONGO?
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), cities do not have the 
authority to manage their land as this authority falls within the remit of 
provinces and the national government. This has resulted in complexity 
and a lack of transparency in the urban land market, making transactions 
very costly. For example, to receive a land registration certificate, one 
has to go through 27 steps, including 3 different points where fees are 
collected and 3 separate field visits. This process can cost up to several 
thousand dollars and is therefore prohibitively expensive for the average 
Congolese.31 The impact of this is evident: an estimate from Lukunga, 
one of the districts in DRC’s capital city of Kinshasa, shows that if 
the current process remains in place, formalising land rights across 
the district may take as much as 350 years.32 
28 Wolff, K and Chipman (2018) “Urban land governance in Dar es Salaam Actors, 
processes and ownership documentation.” International Growth Centre (IGC) working 
paper. C-40412-TZA-1
29 Rosen (2019). “This Tanzanian city may soon be one of the world’s most populous. Is it 
ready?”. National Geographic.
30 Dercon, S, A Haas, S Kriticos and N Lippolis (2019), “Where Africa could learn from the 
Chinese urbanisation story”, IGC Cities that Work Policy Framing Paper
31 World Bank. 2018. Democratic Republic of Congo Urbanization Review: Productive 
and Inclusive Cities for an Emerging Congo. Directions in Development—Environment 
and Sustainable Development;. Washington, DC: World Bank. © World Bank. https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28931 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO
32 Ibid.
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Targeted reforms can improve the functional span of a given urban authorising 
environment. While exact options are highly context-specific, evidence – some 
of which is discussed in this section – suggests that structures which allow for 
the following three crucial aspects can improve functional spans:
1 Clarity of responsibility: Roles and responsibilities of various actors need 
to be clearly defined and, ideally, not divided unnecessarily amongst 
several actors. 
2 Ability to coordinate: In many cities, as actors have become increasingly 
specialised to undertake specific actions, the ensuing challenge has been 
the emergence of organisational silos. These silos prevent agencies from 
sharing information and collaborating to make policy decisions or 
provide a service, leading to fragmented decision-making.
3 Accountability: Clarity of roles allows for accountability to be assigned to 
each actor. When an actor has a clear mandate, it makes it easier for the 
city leadership to hold them accountable for their actions.
How can national governments improve the 
functional span of decision-making?
Over the past fifty years, many countries in the world have adopted 
decentralisation policies to varying degrees that have had significant 
consequences for how city-level policymakers make decisions.33 Three major 
options, when it comes to considering decentralisation, are:
1 First is the option of not decentralising. Urban service delivery can instead 
be undertaken through central (e.g. ministries) and/or intermediate tiers 
of government. This could involve the relevant ministries and agencies 
opening dedicated offices and branches in cities. In this case, the national 
or intermediate tiers of government set policies that are executed in cities 
through its delivery infrastructure. 
This is often the default option in countries with a high degree of political 
centralisation. In Pakistan’s Punjab province, for example, the provincial 
government directly undertook service delivery between late 2009 and 
January 2017. Even outside this period, when a separate tier of local 
government existed, in practice, most of the authority of public service 
delivery was centralised and with the provincial government.34 
 ✓ National and intermediate tiers of governments can more easily 
redistribute resources between wealthy and impoverished cities and 
towns due to the wider scope and coverage of their mandates.
33 Treisman, D (2007), The architecture of government: Rethinking political 
decentralization. Cambridge University Press
34 World Bank (2017), Punjab Cities Program; Combined Project Information Documents / 
Integrated Safeguards Datasheet.
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 ✓ The emergence of large urban agglomerations requires a broader 
network of integrated delivery of public services, such as 
transportation, which a higher-tier government may be better placed to 
provide.
 ✗ Policymaking might be less-responsive to local needs.
 ✗ A key disadvantage of this option is less competition between 
government tiers, which could otherwise incentivise efficiency in public 
service delivery. 
2 Another policy option is delegating power to a dedicated urban public 
organisation to implement policy decisions and provide services. However, 
if this authority is delegated from the national government, such an 
organisation is principally accountable to them and therefore cannot be 
considered an independent tier. In many countries though, this is often the 
most politically feasible option, such as in Kampala (see Box 5), as it does 
not require ceding much authority, but a mere delegation of it.35
BOX 5: GOVERNING KAMPALA
In 2010, an Act of Parliament replaced Kampala’s local government 
structures with the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), a quasi-
corporate entity under the aegis of the central government, and 
entrusted it with undertaking service delivery. 
The establishment of KCCA has, along some dimensions, helped 
streamline governance within the city, creating a results-driven culture 
within the organisation, paving the way for an authorising environment 
more conducive to better service delivery. As a result, there have 
been a number of influential positive reforms, such as around revenue 
collection.36 
Despite such progress, limitations remain. The former Executive Director 
of the KCCA resigned in 2018 after seven years, highlighting inadequate 
political support for KCCA to undertake reforms.37 On the spatial front, 
KCCA’s administrative authority is restricted as its jurisdiction does not 
cover the three other districts (Mpigi, Mukono, and Wakiso) that make 
up the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area.
 ✓ The option can serve as a first step in supporting the development of 
local capacity, which could be leveraged in further decentralisation 
processes of urban government over time. 
35 Dickovick, J T (2011), Decentralization and recentralization in the developing world: 
Comparative studies from Africa and Latin America. Penn State Press.
36 Madinah, N, A Boerhannoeddin, R Noriza Binti Raja Ariffin and B Michael (2015), 
“Recentralization of Kampala city administration in Uganda: Implications for top and 
bottom accountability”, SAGE Open, 5(3), p.2158244015591017.
37 The Independent. “KCCA Executive Director Jennifer Musisi resigns.” 
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 ✓ It makes it easier to align national and urban policies, as the 
organisation is directly accountable to the national government.
 ✗ Due to the fact that it is one step removed from the people, such 
an organisation might lack legitimacy, therefore making voluntary 
enforcement with decisions harder to achieve. This is particularly 
important in cities where the opposition parties have widespread 
support.38
3 Alternately, through the process of political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation, policymakers can establish an independent city-level 
local government. Under this model, cities are legally empowered to 
undertake certain functions independent of the central governments 
and within a specific geographical remit. They typically also have some 
system of local checks and balances, such as elections. While decentralised 
governments vary in scope, the premise is that they are principally 
accountable downwards to their jurisdictions, and to a lesser extent 
upwards to national governments.39
South Africa is an example of such decentralised city-level governments, 
a model that has been codified in their 1996 Constitution. In particular, 
the metropolitan-level government is considered one of three spheres 
of government with responsibility for the provision of a range of local 
services and infrastructure such as water, sanitation, and electricity.40 
Mayors who head local governments, are elected by their jurisdictions as 
opposed to being appointed by the central government. 
 ✓ Experiences suggest that by pushing accountability downwards 
towards residents of the city, local governments can be more 
responsive to the needs of residents.41 This may also help in building 
legitimacy by improving the perception of state responsiveness, 
although legitimacy is also deeply interlinked with the political system 
of the city (see Box 6).42
 ✓ Under certain conditions, this option can encourage competition 
between various urban government units, pushing them towards better 
performance.43
38 Resnick, D (2014), Urban governance and service delivery in African cities: the role of 
politics and policies. Development Policy Review, 32(s1), pp.s3-s17.
39 Smoke, P (2015), “Accountability and service delivery in decentralising environments: 
Understanding context and strategically advancing reform”, A Governance Practitioner’s 
Notebook, 219.
40 Yemek, E (2005), Understanding Fiscal Decentralisation in South Africa, Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Pretoria
41 Faguet, J-P and C Pöschl eds. (2015), Is decentralization good for development?: 
Perspectives from academics and policy makers. Oxford University Press, USA.
42 Faguet, J-P and C Pöschl eds. (2015), Is decentralization good for development?: 
Perspectives from academics and policy makers. Oxford University Press, USA.
43 OECD (2019), Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy-Makers, OECD 
Multi-level Governance Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
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 ✗ However, incomplete or unclear decentralisation can lead to 
overlapping authority between various tiers of government, with 
the urban authorising environment being fragmented once again on 
functional lines. In South African cities, public transport planning 
and integration are made difficult because a national state-owned 
enterprise controls urban commuter rail transport, while cities manage 
other transport services separately.
 ✗ Without an appropriate integrating framework, decentralised local 
governments may lead to a mismatch between national and local 
plans, restricting the authorising environment to fragmented time 
horizons.
 ✗ Decentralisation may lead to spatial inequality, with national 
governments finding it harder to redistribute resources from more to 
less advantaged cities. However, this can be mitigated through other 
national policies.44
BOX 6: BUILDING PRACTICAL LEGITIMACY 
An important feature of governance is building the legitimacy of public 
actors, so people are willing to comply with policy decisions. Instead 
of taking it as a forgone feature of the city, legitimacy needs to be 
achieved through specific decisions that increase service delivery and 
improve communications.45 One way might be to start with providing 
service improvements that are immediately visible to the populace. For 
example, the former Mayor of Kabul attempted to do this by placing 
garbage bins in major markets and drafting an awareness strategy for 
citizens to use it. 
A sign encouraging 
people to pay taxes in 
Mzuzu. Image by Oliver 
Harman.
44 Shankar, R and A Shah (2003), “Bridging the economic divide within countries: 
A scorecard on the performance of regional policies in reducing regional income 
disparities”, World development, 31(8), pp.1421-1441.
45 Woo, J J, M Ramesh and M Howlett (2015), “Legitimation capacity: System-level 
resources and political skills in public policy”, Policy and Society, 34(3-4), pp.271-283.
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How can city-level policymakers improve 
functional span of decision-making?
There is often a trade-off between more specialisation and stronger 
coordination. Generally, more specialisation allows for actors to focus on 
building a specific skillset, while more coordination paves the way for more 
integrated service delivery.46 City-level policymakers often have several policy 
options that they can deploy, each with associated trade-offs.47 
Typically, there are two types of agencies that can benefit from more 
coordination. 
First, are those agencies which provide a single service, but across different 
geographic areas or different parts of the delivery chain, such as transport or 
housing.48 Singapore does this for for both transport and housing provision (see 
Box 7). 
BOX 7: INTEGRATING SERVICES INTO A SINGLE AGENCY IN 
SINGAPORE
In Singapore, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) acts as a 
single agency to coordinate the entire housing value chain. HDB’s role 
includes acquiring the land, resettlement of people in land purchased, 
building homes, providing financing options for potential buyers, 
and managing sold and rented properties.49 Singapore’s decision to 
allocate all housing-related functions to a single agency resulted from 
the need to streamline statutory allocation and, consequently, improve 
accountability. 
Typical housing blocks 
in Singapore. Image by 
Philippe Put.
46 Bouckaert, G, B G Peters and K Verhoest (2016), Coordination of public sector 
organizations. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
47 Peters, B G (2018), “The challenge of policy coordination”, Policy Design and Practice, 
1(1), pp.1-11.
48 See for example: Dimitriou, H T and A H Cook eds. (2018), Land-use/transport planning 
in Hong Kong: A review of principles and practices. Routledge.
49 Chin, L (2004), “Public housing governance in Singapore: Current issues and 
challenges”, Unpublished report, Department of Real Estate, National University of 
Singapore, Singapore.
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Second, the agencies that can benefit from more coordination and stronger 
integration are those with differing but highly complementary mandates, such 
as transport and land-use planning (see Box 8).50
Figure 5 illustrates three such options for integration. The choice of option will 
depend on whether the urban government wants to promote more specialisation 
or stronger coordination, and the type of incentives that greater coordination or 
specialisation will create.
BOX 8: INTEGRATION OF TRANSPORT AND LAND-USE 
PLANNING 
Transport and land-use planning are tied together: the expansion 
of human settlements needs the necessary transport planning to 
accompany it so people are able to move around the city. In many 
cities, however, their functions are split with the transport agencies 
usually preoccupied with the operational development and management 
of public transportation, and with little to no focus on the spatial 
consequences of their decisions.51 At the same time, land-use planners 
often fail to consider and adequately account for future transportation 
infrastructure needs, which inhibits efficient growth of the city.52
However, with appropriate functional integration between the two, cities 
can benefit:
 — First, integrating land-use and transport planning can help prevent 
urban sprawl (when cities consist of sparsely connected low-
50 McLeod, S, J Scheurer and C Curtis (2017), “Urban public transport: planning principles 
and emerging practice”, Journal of Planning Literature, 32(3), pp.223-239.
51 Cervero, R (2013), “Linking urban transport and land use in developing 
countries”, Journal of Transport and Land Use, 6(1), pp.7-24.
52 Suzuki, H, R Cervero and K Iuchi (2013), Transforming cities with transit: transit 
and land-use integration for sustainable urban development: Main report (). Urban 
development series. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/947211468162273111/Main-report. 
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density human settlements).53 Instead, by combining the two it can 
foster denser settlements with well-planned public transportation 
systems. For example, Figure 4 shows two cities, Atlanta and 
Barcelona, with similar populations but with Atlanta occupying a 
built-up land area 26 times larger than that of Barcelona. The red line 
illustrates the public transit lanes in each city. Due to differences in 
density, the same length of the metro line is accessible to about 60% 
of the population in Barcelona but only 4% in Atlanta.54
 — Second, such integration can also help the city leverage land 
strategically in areas surrounding major transport infrastructure 
(such as the mass transit system). This can provide an opportunity 
for the city to recapture some of the value of their investments, from 
the rise in land values. If this is done and properly re-invested, it 
can help to subsidise collective mobility.55 The exemplary case here 
is Hong Kong, where the municipal transit company adopts a “Rail 
plus Property” (R+P) model of capturing the increment in land value 
surrounding railway lines . The strategy has been successful, with 
the revenue from land value capture usually outstripping the revenue 
from user fees.56
Figure 4: Atlanta and Barcelona urban sprawl
53 Doi, K (2015), “Cities and transportation”, Traffic and Safety Sciences—Interdisciplinary 
Wisdom of IATSS, International Association of Traffic and Safety Sciences, pp.12-21.
54 The image is copied from http://alainbertaud.com. The personal website of Alain 
Bertaud, a senior researcher at NYU’s Stern Urbanization Project. 
55 Collier, P, E Glaeser, A Venables, P Manwaring and M Blake (2017), “Accessing 
opportunities: policy decisions for enhancing urban mobility – version 2”, IGC Cities that 
Work Policy Brief.
56 Suzuki, H, J Murakami, B C Tamayose and Y Hong (2015), Financing transit-oriented 
development with land values: adapting land value capture in developing countries 
(English). Urban development series. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
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Merging agencies, which provide a single service, has the following advantage:
 ✓ If done well, this can allow for less fragmentation in service delivery by 
providing users access to a more coherent infrastructure and therefore 
improved service delivery. For example, in Helsinki, Finland, the city 
along with its neighbouring eight municipalities, has established a single 
transit agency, the Helsinki Regional Transport Authority. The agency 
has the legal mandate to manage all public transportation in the region, 
allowing it to have a unified ticketing system. The commuters generally 
claim to be highly satisfied with the public transport in the area (see Box 9 
for further discussion).57
BOX 9: LEAD AGENCY FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT
One way to improve the provision of effective mobility infrastructure 
is to establish a single lead agency responsible for spearheading the 
administration of all public transport in a city. 
If done properly, this can help the government to:
 ✓ Promote inter-modal transport;
 ✓ Reduce organisational friction between various transport 
administrators; 
 ✓ Help build a unified capacity for urban transport; and
 ✓ Provide more equal access to services throughout the municipality.
The exact role of these transport agencies varies between cities. 
Singapore, for example, in 1995 established a consolidated 
transportation agency, the Land Transport Authority (LTA). Backed by 
dedicated legislation, LTA has the statutory powers to administer all 
land-based transport services in the city-state.58 
Other cities have followed a similar, although slightly differing, 
strategy; Lagos, for example, has established the Lagos Metropolitan 
Area Transport Authority (LMATA), a single agency to coordinate all 
transport-related agencies, as well as to award concessions and levy 
transport user fees.59 
57 Wilcox, Z and N Nohrová (2014), “Delivering change: Making transport work for 
cities Practical policy solutions to improving transport in cities”, Centre for Cities. 
Available online at: https://www.centreforcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/14-05-01-
Delivering-change-Making-transport-work-for-cities.pdf  
58 India has also expanded the establishment of single urban transport agencies known as 
‘Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority.’
59 “Kumar, A and O P Agarwal (2013), "Institutional Labyrinth: Designing a Way 
Out for Improving Urban Transport Services--Lessons from Current Practice". 
World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/17630 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”
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Traffic in Lagos. Image 
by Adedotun Ajibade.
In comparison, Cairo has about 18 separate government entities and 
four parastatal organisations with each a substantial role in Greater 
Cairo’s transportation, contributing to a fragmented transport system 
with little intra-modal integration.60
Other times more specialisation is needed to ensure focussed outcomes are 
achieved, such as the case in Kampala (see Box 10). Especially in the case where 
agencies considered for the merger are not directly and strongly complementary 
to each other. Or, where service delivery or policy formulation requires a vastly 
different skillset, making a potential merger quite complex. Managing larger 
organisations is also more complex and such capacity may not be present, 
or achievable. If two roles are merged, there may be a fear of one crowding 
out the other. In cases where such incentives are created, a softer governance 
arrangement might be more appropriate where responsibilities remain distant.
BOX 10: FOCUSING ON PRIORITY ISSUES 
It is important to consider the incentives created for public officials 
when responsibilities are merged into a single department. At times, 
policymakers have done the opposite and created narrower incentives 
so they are adequately focussed, by creating agencies which have 
a single objective. Kampala provides an example of this. In 2011, 
the city split revenue collection and expenditure. The result has led 
to positive outcomes: the city managed to increase local revenue 
by nearly three times within four years.61 This was achieved entirely 
through administrative reforms that the Directorate was empowered to 
undertake.62 
In this way, a champion agency can pull the city into a virtuous cycle. 
Good governance arrangements can usher in higher revenue, which 
can, in turn, be used to finance investments, allowing for further revenue 
60 Gómez-Álvarez, D, R M Rajack, E López-Moreno and G Lanfranchi eds. (2017), Steering 
the Metropolis: Metropolitan Governance for Sustainable Urban Development. Inter-
American Development Bank.
61 Kopanyi, M (2015), “Local Revenue Reform - Kampala Capital City Authority”, London: 
International Growth Centre
62 Andema, F and A Haas (2017), “Efficient and effective municipal tax administration: a 
case study of the Kampala Capital City Authority. London”, IGC Cities that Work Case 
Study.
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for the municipal government. For example, the cost of operations of 
Kampala’s new Directorate of Revenue Collection, as a percentage of 
revenue collected, increased from a mere 1% in 2011 to about 11% by 
2014.63 Much of this was associated with one-off capital investments in 
capacity, such as procuring an electronic revenue management system. 
This investment, while significant, paved the way for a considerable 
increase in local revenue, making the long-run gains from this investment 
more than worth the initial investment.
When reforms are more complex, requiring a change in behaviour by 
people from different sectors, levels, and agencies within a government, 
the Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation approach provides a useful 
framework. It encourages policymakers to look at specific problems 
and creates an adequate authorising environment for the reform (with 
a focus on experimentation and strong feedback) to generate, test, 
and refine solutions in response to these problems.64 The focus is on 
creating a process of solving problems which infuses legitimacy into 
the solution, rather than getting a perceived ‘right solution’. In this way, 
instead of setting up a dedicated agency, reform typically involves 
setting up broad coalitions of people with a shared goal who have the 
power to take decisions.65
An alternative can be to establish softer governance arrangements, such as 
coordination committees or working groups. They can either be temporary, 
formed when required, and subsequently disbanded; or they can be permanent. 
In several cities, such softer governance arrangements are used to implement 
strategies that have cross-sectoral implications.
 ✓ A significant benefit of this option is that it can leverage coordination and 
collaboration with a much larger number of stakeholders. For example, 
the city of Medellín, in Colombia, has a Municipal Housing Policy 
Committee, which is tasked to undertake integrated housing planning, 
bringing together the heads of planning, housing, environmental, and 
public works departments of the city .66 All department heads have an 
incentive to cooperate as they report to the same city leader.
 ✓ As this arrangement can also be ad-hoc, established when needed and 
dismantled once the goal has been achieved, it does not continue to draw 
unnecessarily on resources, when the agency itself is no longer required. 
This type of arrangement is used in several Chinese cities for drafting 
municipal environment protection policies; working groups are set up, 
63 Andema, F and A Haas (2017), “Efficient and effective municipal tax administration: a 
case study of the Kampala Capital City Authority. London”, IGC Cities that Work Case 
Study.
64 Andrews, M, L Pritchett, S Samji and M Woolcock (2015), “Building capability by 
delivering results: Putting Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) principles into 
practice”, A Governance Practitioner’s Notebook, 123.
65 Whaites, A, E Gonzalez, S Fyson and G Teskey (2015), A governance practitioner’s 
notebook: Alternative ideas and approaches. Paris: OECD.
66 Rode, P, C  Heeckt, R Ahrend, O Huerta Melchor, A Robert, N Badstuber, A Hoolachan 
and C Kwami (2017), “Integrating national policies to deliver compact, connected cities: an 
overview of transport and housing”.
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headed by the mayor or vice-mayor, and then disbanded once the policy 
has been formulated.67
 ✗ Without the right incentive structure to promote collaboration between 
stakeholders, these arrangements can fail to deliver. For example, Dhaka 
established the Dhaka Transport Coordination Authority (DTCA) in 
2012 to coordinate transport-related activities and undertake strategic 
planning for the sector in the city. However, due to the lack of authority 
over other agencies in the transport sector, DTCA has been unable to 
effectively coordinate various actors, resulting in a fragmented transport 
infrastructure in one of the fastest growing megacities in the world (see 
Box 11).68
BOX 11: HOW CAN INFORMATION-SHARING BE IMPROVED IN 
CITY PLANNING?
Despite having a myriad plans, Dhaka has had little planned 
development.  For example, in 2005 the city adopted a 20-year transport 
strategy for the city, which included a US$5.5 billion investment in 
specific transport projects. However, an assessment conducted in 2016 
found that while some road upgrading had occurred, none of the major 
investments planned – particularly in the mass rapid transit – had been 
implemented in the first half of the 20-year planning period.69
This is, in part, due to the isolated nature in which plans are drafted 
in the city, often by consultants and with little input from the relevant 
stakeholders.70 The result is a partial implementation of many major 
plans, due to lack of ownership and/or the fact that they are not realistic 
given local conditions. One policy option to mitigate these concerns 
is establishing a clear and pragmatic planning hierarchy. This means 
the city government creates a framework under which all plans fall, 
with a clear division of mandate that each level of the plan has, thereby 
providing the urban government a built-in structural mechanism to 
ensure participation of relevant stakeholders. In other words, an urban 
planning hierarchy.
Durban in South Africa, is an example of a city that does this effectively. 
The city has an integrated hierarchy of plans, with plans moving from 
higher-scale strategy to lower-scale implementation, and with the 
lower-scale plans legally required to be consistent with the higher-scale 
ones.71
67 Kostka, G eds. (2017), Local environmental politics in China: Challenges and 
innovations. Routledge
68 Bird, J, Y Li, H Z Rahman, M Rama and A J Venables (2018), Toward Great Dhaka: A 
New Urban Development Paradigm.
69 ibid.
70 ibid. pg. 41
71 eThekwini Municipality (2009) Integrated Development Plan. Online: http://www.
durban.gov.za/Documents/City_Government/IDP_Policy/IDP_2009_10.pdf 
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4 Improving the temporal span of 
decision-making 
For effective urban policymaking, cities need to be able to plan and act in 
advance of future growth; in particular, to be able to make the necessary 
investments in infrastructure and institutions before people settle. These 
investments can take several years to build and even longer to pay off.72 
However, in many cities, decisions are often taken over the short-term horizon, 
either responding to situations retroactively or as a result of political cycles. 
Some cities, for example many of those in China, have managed to adopt 
policies that provide for more proactive, long-term planning (see Box 12).
BOX 12: HOW CHINESE CITIES PLANNED AHEAD
In a period of just over three decades, China has been able to move as 
many as 700 million people to its cities — the size of urban transition 
no other country can claim to match.73 At the same time, it has created 
governance and institutional structures that are more conducive to long-
term planning by providing flexibility and adaption to changing urban 
needs. 
The Chinese urban planning system is hierarchical, with top-tier 
plans setting long-term policy, and lower-tier plans focussing on 
implementation and regulation. The central and provincial levels prepare 
conceptual plans, which are approved by the central State Council. The 
municipal master plans, along with district plans, development control 
plans and project site plans, which are highly detailed, fall under the 
privy of the municipal-level institutions. 
To maintain consistency, the municipal master plans are approved by 
the provincial State Council, while other plans are approved by the 
municipality itself.74 However, there is now some evidence showing that 
this distinction is becoming less clear due to the speed of urban growth 
and fiscal decentralisation, undermining long-term planning.75
72 Collier, P and A J Venables (2017), “Urbanization in developing economies: the 
assessment”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 33(3), pp.355-372.
73 Dercon, S, A Haas, S Kriticos and N Lippolis (2019), “Where Africa could learn from the 
Chinese urbanisation story”, IGC Cities that Work Policy Framing Paper
74 Abramson, D B (2006), “Urban Planning in China: Continuity and Change: What the 
future holds may surprise you”, Journal of the American Planning Association, 72(2), 
pp.197-215.
75 Ibid.
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The benefits of institutions being able to plan over the longer term can be 
substantial: 
 ✓ As noted, long-term planning can help cities invest in the necessary 
infrastructure before people have settled. Evidence across countries has 
shown that this is considerably cheaper than retrofitting infrastructure.76 
 ✓ Long-term public decisions can provide direction and help manage 
expectations for the individual decisions made by people and firms of 
where to locate and invest in a city.77 
 ✗ However, it may be politically difficult to spend resources on future 
populations that have not settled yet, as opposed to using resources to 
deliver services to the ones that are already settled.
How can national policymakers improve temporal 
reach of decision-making?
Longer-term planning will require cities to have a sufficient and predictable 
flow of resources. National policymakers can play an important role here in the 
following ways: 
 — Delegating financial powers that correspond with functional 
responsibilities: If national governments decide to decentralise 
infrastructure and service delivery responsibilities, these services need to 
be backed by resources. This can be through a combination of various 
ways, including fiscal transfers from the national governments, as well as 
enabling local governments to raise their own source revenues.78 
 — Establishing a transparent framework for managing fiscal transfers: 
The framework for allocating and managing fiscal transfers is key 
in supporting local governments to plan and predict their funding . 
Transparency in this respect can be improved in several ways, including 
publishing multi-year projections of funding from the national 
government and a transparent formula through which these transfers are 
calculated.79
 — Ensuring a stable stream of revenue for urban governments: Local 
governments generally rely on fiscal transfers from higher-tier 
governments to finance the bulk of their expenditure. For developing 
76 Strand, J, S Miller and S Siddiqui (2011), Infrastructure investments under uncertainty 
with the possibility of retrofit: theory and simulations. The World Bank.
77 Collier, P (2017), “African urbanization: an analytic policy guide”, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 33(3), pp.405-437.
78 Hart, T and B Welham (2016), “Fiscal decentralisation A public financial management 
introductory guide”, Overseas Development Institute.
79 Shah, A (2006), A practitioner's guide to intergovernmental fiscal transfers (English). 
Policy, Research working paper no. WPS 4039. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
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countries, between 2006 and 2010, fiscal transfers were estimated to 
make between 49% and 62% of local government budgets.80 
Overall, the key is to ensure that there is sufficient long-term funding to 
plan and invest in future urban growth  (see Box 13). There is some evidence 
to suggest that carefully designed transfers can be used to incentivise city 
governments to raise revenue through local sources.81 However, a more 
sustainable route to financing urban development, as well as strengthening 
legitimacy for urban governments, is for national governments to empower 
them to develop their own-source revenue streams as a complement to fiscal 
transfers. 
Local governments are better placed to levy certain taxes, particularly those 
with immobile bases, such as land and property. These taxes provide an 
essential source of revenue for city governments, which they can then further 
leverage to borrow capital.82 Additionally, user fees for certain services, where 
users can directly pay for the services they receive, can provide a further source 
of revenue. However, it is not always possible to levy user fees, particularly for 
public goods where users cannot be excluded, as well as the fact that these are 
revenues that will only become available once the service is in place.83 
BOX 13: HELPING CITIES INVEST IN THEIR FUTURE 
Dedicated loans or grants by national governments can be used to 
incentivise local urban governments to make long-term investments, 
helping improve the temporal reach of local decision-making. To do so, 
governments can explore funding vehicles such as the Development 
Fund for Local Authorities (DFLA) established by the Government of 
Malawi and the World Bank in 1993 to provide low-interest loans to local 
governments. Along with more short-term loans, which make the bulk of 
the funding, DFLA also provides local authorities with long-term loans 
that encourage infrastructure investments by local governments.84
80 Gadenne, L and M Singhal (2014), "Decentralization in developing economies”, Annu. 
Rev. Econ., 6(1), pp.581-604.
81 Troland, E (2016), “Can Fiscal Transfers Increase Local Revenue Collection? Evidence 
From The Philippines”, Evidence from the Philippines.
82 Collier, P, E Glaeser, A Venables, P Manwaring and M Blake (2018), “Land and property 
taxes for municipal finance – version 2”, IGC Cities that Work Policy Paper.
83 Bird, R M (2001), “User charges in local government finance”, The Challenge of Urban 
Government, pp.171-182.
84 Delbridge, V and O Harman (Forthcoming), “Secondary cities leading innovation 
on municipal finance reform: Enhancing the financial positions of cities, learnings from 
Malawi”, Unpublished IGC Working Draft, November 2019
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How can local policymakers improve temporal 
reach of decision-making?
Over the past few years, three major Indonesian cities have established City 
Planning Labs.85 These labs are municipal-level facilities dedicated to providing 
data and analysis to the city government. Furthermore, they have a specific 
capacity-building component, where over time, they can help city policymakers 
build their own analytical capacity to use this data for making planning and 
investment decisions.86 In Semarang, for example, the lab has conducted data 
analyses in a variety of areas, including on the water supply network and 
poverty rates, to input into the city’s medium-term plan.87
Establishing such dedicated organisations, like these labs, can act as a way for 
cities to take a longer-time horizon in policymaking. New York City does this 
through its Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability (OLTPS). Set up in 
2006, OLTPS coordinates NYC’s progress towards PlaNYC – a strategic plan to 
prepare the city for a million new residents.
 ✓ As these are dedicated organisations which are relatively insulated from 
the day-to-day matters of city service delivery, they can more effectively 
fulfil their mandate for long-term planning. 
 ✓ If they are empowered to do so, they can also coordinate with a large 
variety of actors to make sure such plans are realistic and can ultimately 
be implemented. For example, in many cities, data is collected and stored 
separately by several agencies with little coordination amongst them.88 
A dedicated data agency could work across all the individual agencies, 
to not only ensure there is a central repository for urban data, but also 
that there are common standards so data from different agencies can be 
collated.
 ✗ There is a strong possibility that such agencies might have weak levels of 
accountability as these structures are not immediately exposed to political 
time horizons.
 ✗ The costs of setting up and running a separate agency, both from a 
financial as well as a human resource perspective, may restrict the use of 
this option.
85 Hao, J, J Zhu and R Zhong (2015), “The rise of big data on urban studies and planning 
practices in China: Review and open research issues”, Journal of Urban Management, 4(2), 
pp.92-124.
86 Yuwono, T, A Sevtsuk and R Amindarbari (2013), City Planning Labs (CPL): a concept 
for strengthening city planning capacity in Indonesia (English). Washington, DC; World 
Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/731961468041432789/City-
Planning-Labs-CPL-a-concept-for-strenghtening-city-planning-capacity-in-Indonesia. 
87 World Bank. (2016). How Sharing Data and Collaboration Can Improve 
Indonesia’s Urban Planning. [online] Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
feature/2016/09/22/how-gathering-data-in-one-place-can-improve-indonesia-cities 
[Accessed 13 Feb. 2019].
88 Hao, J, J Zhu and R Zhong (2015), “The rise of big data on urban studies and planning 
practices in China: Review and open research issues”, Journal of Urban Management, 4(2), 
pp.92-124.
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Another policy option could be establishing parastatal bodies to undertake 
service delivery in key policy areas.
Parastatal agencies, which are usually state-owned and funded, are relatively 
autonomous in their operations. This is mostly due to separate corporate 
identity and a different set of organisational accountabilities. Transport for 
London (TfL) is an example. It has been in charge of strategic planning of 
transport services in London, along with an ability to negotiate long-term 
funding plans with the government .89  
Parastatal agencies have a mixed record: while some parastatal agencies have 
been effective in planning for longer-term horizons and delivering better 
services (see Box 14), there are also several cases where they exist as ineffective 
organisations that rely on bailouts and government guarantees to function. 
The difference can be due to various reasons including the legal framework that 
shapes or restricts political interference with the agencies, and whether these 
agencies rely on government transfers or user fees to function – as the former 
may incentivise financial inefficiency and political influence.
BOX 14: PHNOM PENH WATER SUPPLY AUTHORITY
Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority is an autonomous public water 
supply operator in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh. Historically, the 
authority was considered plagued with a deep culture of inefficiency 
and corruption: for example, in the 1980s, it was estimated that 80% of 
its staff worked less than two hours per day. This started to change in 
the 1990s: the authority was allowed to charge tariffs to its customers 
for water supply, and then in 1996, a new law made the authority 
legally independent with financial autonomy. Between 1994 and 2008, 
the authority increased its annual water production by 437%, while 
drastically expanding its customer base.90 Although it still remains a 
government-owned company, it has been listed on the Cambodian 
Stock Exchange — helping build its separate corporate identity. 
89 Wilcox, Z and N Nohrová (2014), “Delivering change: Making transport work for 
cities”, Centre for Cities.
90 Biswas, A K and C Tortajada (2010), “Water supply of Phnom Penh: an example of good 
governance”, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 26(2), pp.157-172.
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5 Concluding remarks and next 
steps 
In many fast-growing cities, the decision-making structures are not conducive to 
the effective delivery of infrastructure and services. A number of reasons impede 
the economic benefits of urbanisation, including inadequate decentralisation 
with unstable fiscal frameworks; poor allocation of responsibilities between 
public actors; public agencies that are fragmented across space; and incentives 
that undermine long-term planning.
Changing these institutional structures is complex. Reforms can be too broad 
and may not end up solving the problems they are meant to. Given this, the 
paper focuses explicitly on the authorising environment: the formal structures 
which determine decision-making across spatial, functional, and temporal lines. 
The politics or the implementation of decision-making falls outside the remit 
of this paper. Cross-country evidence suggests that reforms in these areas have 
helped solve real-world problems cities face.
 — Spatial: The spatial lens is the most visible manifestation of the ineffective 
authorising environment: cities have often grown beyond the jurisdiction 
of single local government units. National policymakers have various 
policy options to mitigate this: they can merge local units, or set up a new 
layer to coordinate and provide some services. Urban government units 
can also take action by voluntarily cooperating with neighbouring units 
to improve the spatial authorising environment and allow for integrated 
service delivery across the urban area.
 — Functional: In many cities, unclear responsibilities reduce accountability 
and leave critical policy and service delivery gaps. While most countries 
have devolved some power to urban government units, they have done so 
to differing extents, giving cities varying ability to make decisions locally. 
Within a given space to make decisions, urban policymakers face trade-
offs around governance arrangements, especially the trade-off between 
incentivising specialisation and cooperation between urban agencies. For 
example, some services such as transport are often fragmented across 
various agencies and might benefit from integration. Regardless of 
options, evidence suggests that clarity of responsibility, and the ability to 
coordinate between various roles with clear assignment of accountability 
to each actor is critical to effective decision-making.
 — Temporal: Good authorising environments allow cities to plan ahead. 
This requires stable financial flows over time, based on a clear legal 
framework, leaving national policymakers to navigate the decision on 
how to provide a stable stream of revenue without discouraging cities to 
generate own-source revenue. With the desire to mitigate short political 
cycles that often dictate policy decisions, urban policymakers have 
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established dedicated public organisations to develop long-term plans. 
Others rely on parastatal organisations which can nurture a unique 
culture and develop specialised expertise to provide certain services with 
long-time horizons, such as transport and water supply.  
While this focused lens is useful in providing an agenda for the first step 
towards building the foundation on which rapidly growing cities can be 
effectively managed , it only considers a limited aspect of the governance 
of cities. It principally deals with the making of the decision but not the 
implementation of these decisions; questions around how to motivate public 
officials to implement decisions falls out of the focus here.91 In addition to 
this, there are important cross-cutting elements that need to be considered for 
institutional reforms to work effectively. Three significant factors are:
 — Exact policy reforms must depend heavily on the specific context of that 
city, particularly considering that cities have progressed under differing 
authorising environments. This paper outlines some directions, but any 
mimicry of practices of other cities without embeddedness in the local 
context is unlikely to have positive outcomes. Instead, cross-country 
evidence should be used to inform, not dictate reforms. 
 — Reforms that change decision-making structures need to involve a broad 
set of agents by involving all people that would be impacted by changes. 
New laws and rules can go unimplemented if they are not owned, used, 
or diffused by implementing agents actively.92 The PDIA approach, briefly 
91 There is extensive literature on this question, summarised by Bandiera, O., Khan, 
A. and Tobias, J. (2017). Rewarding bureaucrats: Can incentives improve public sector 
performance? IGC Growth Brief Series 008. London: International Growth Centre.
92 Andrews, M (2013), The limits of institutional reform in development: Changing rules 
for realistic solutions. Cambridge University Press.
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discussed in Box 10, focuses on a broad set of agents working together in 
designing and implementing reforms.93
 — Linked to the need to contextualise the nature of reforms and involving 
a broad set of agents, is the need to embed the reform into the political 
structures and institutions of a given city. Almost always, the reform 
process includes bargaining between various groups — civil servants, 
political parties, general public — who have different interests and 
perspectives.94 For starters, understanding how key constituencies perceive 
the reform can provide valuable insight into its potential success or 
failure.
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